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information contained within these desirable pieces of
equipment is imperative and even acknowledged and
supported by Government [5],[6].
The problem is magnified because users are finding
themselves in possession of an ever growing number of
digital devices, each one having its own associated security
requirements. With several being carried concurrently, at the
moment of initial use it is likely that similar procedures of
authentication are undertaken repeatedly across the disparate
entities to ensure full activation. This repetitive and timeconsuming operation raises the question of whether there is a
better way and does the collective identity knowledge
possessed by the multiplicity of secured devices utilized by
an individual at any given time present an opportunity to
improve security. As each device is activated a set of
authentication credentials are determined and access is either
granted or denied. By enabling the individual and distinct
devices to communicate their own authentication status and
to share established user identity confidence it may be
possible to synthesize an enhanced form of security.
This paper explores this concept and proposes an
approach through which authentication credentials can be
distributed amongst devices and how this information can be
used to create a novel method of security and user control. It
addresses the requirements to produce a flexible, adaptive
and non-intrusive security mechanism that will meet future
demands and provide a foundation for further development.
Firstly, the background explores the current methods of
securing mobile devices and the associated weaknesses.
Once these foundations have been laid the paper continues to
outline the new proposals and considers how they will
improve upon the situation at present.

Abstract—As the requirement for companies and individuals to
protect information and personal details comes more into
focus, the implementation of security that goes beyond the
ubiquitous password or Personal Identification Number (PIN)
is paramount. With the ever growing number of us utilizing
more than one device simultaneously, the problem and need is
compounded. This paper proposes a novel approach to security
that leverages the collective confidence of user identity held by
the multiplicity of devices present at any given time. User
identity confidence is reinforced by sharing established
credentials between devices, enabling them to make informed
judgments on their own security position. An Adaptive
Security Control Engine (ASCE) is outlined, illustrating how
an environment sensitive and adaptive security envelope can be
established and maintained around an individual.
Keywords- authentication, identification, mobile, security,
biometric, identity

I.

INTRODUCTION

The aspiration of people to be mobile and yet remain in
communication with colleagues, family and friends has
driven the use of devices that support and complement this
lifestyle. Estimates suggest that worldwide Wi-Fi hotspot
usage during 2009 increased to 1.2 billion connections, an
increase of 47% from 2008, with this being driven by a 50%
increase in the sale of Wi-Fi capable handsets between 2007
and 2008 [1]. Technological evolution has enabled powerful
and sophisticated systems to be accommodated into these
handheld electronic gadgets furnishing them with extensive
storage and processing capabilities, making them an
increasing target for thieves. In 2007-8 over 700,000
handsets were stolen in the UK, with 50% of all robberies
targeting a mobile phone in the items taken and in 33% of
those offences it was the only stolen possession [2]. Between
May and June 2009 alone, the UK saw an 11% increase in
the reporting of missing/stolen mobile phones, with 84% of
theft victims failing to retrieve their lost handsets [3].
However, theft is not the sole reason for concern; a New
York survey revealed that during a six month period in 2008,
31,544 phones and 2,752 other types of handheld device
(laptops, PDAs, memory sticks etc.) were simply left in the
city’s Yellow Cabs, an average of more than two per cab [4].
In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the
potentially large volumes of sensitive and personal
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II.

BACKGROUND

Security is founded on three key principles – something
an individual knows, they possess or they are [7].
Knowledge and possession based security both rely upon the
inherently weak link in the chain – the user. The first utilizes
a piece of significant or memorable information which is
often forgotten or written down [8]; the second, the
presentation of a physical key or token at the required
moment. Forgetting, mislaying or losing the crucial item or
information will bar further access attempts.
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The ubiquitous point of entry user identity code/password
has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this
sensitive information correctly [9]. To maintain security it is
supposedly known or more precisely memorized exclusively
by the creator [10] but is too often shared or inadvertently
communicated [11]. Although different; identification and
authentication both rely upon the recognition of the identity
of a user interacting with a device at any given moment.
Hand held mobile devices typically assume the identity of
the user and utilize personal identification numbers (PINs) to
authenticate 1 this at point-of-entry. The authentication is
Boolean; the subject is either deemed to be whom they
purport to be or they are not, without any middle ground.
Frequently passing the one-off process will permit
unregulated access to all facilities and utilities installed on
the device [12]. Therefore once access has been gained the
ability to incur large telephone bills or excessive high-cost
data downloads is readily available to impostors who
compromise the PIN.
In the search for evermore appropriate and robust
authentication, attention has turned to biometrics (something
the user is) to establish methods that cannot easily be
compromised, are non-intrusive and equally eliminate the
potential threat posed by social engineering [13]. A finer
granularity of identification can be achieved; ultimately the
device will either issue or refuse access to the user, however
the starting confidence can precisely reflect how well the
supplied identity matches the known template sample.
Having this ability will allow a device to tailor its reaction to
strong and weak authentication attempts accordingly.
Further, without fundamentally changing the habits to which
users are accustomed improvements can be implemented. As
a supplementary development, layered authentication
techniques have been explored and employed to compound
protection and expand the sophistication required to
circumvent defense mechanisms including; password and
facial recognition [14], fingerprint scan and tokenized
random number [15], teeth imaging and voice pattern
verification [16]. This can then be reinforced by elements
such as location information which indicates whether or not
a user is operating in a known and unsurprising locale [17].
Currently security that is founded on point of entry
authentication that remains static for the duration of
interaction is unable to prevent misuse succeeding a hijack,
when following a legitimate log-on the piece of equipment is
illicitly removed or used by another. If this occurs and the
device is kept active and not switched off, free and open use
can be maintained for a significant period of time. With 85%
of owners admitting their mobile phone is on for over 10
hours per day [9], to counteract this weakness proposals to
degrade service availability over time have been made
[13],[14] enabling the device to shut down functionality
unless re-authentication occurs.
As several gadgets are frequently carried simultaneously
any intrinsic security weakness is amplified especially as

people will often use the same PIN for more than one device,
if not all of them [9]. Once one is compromised by the
discovery or disclosure of the PIN then it is possible that all
the owned devices become vulnerable.
To circumvent the associated weaknesses of point-ofentry authentication it would be advantageous to augment
the process with ongoing reassurances. Establishing user
identification during the initial sign-on and then
authenticating at intervals to maintain confidence allows
opened devices to be secured against potential theft or loss.
Although a device may be open and fully usable upon
stealing, without successful re-authentication within a
limited timeframe it would become inoperable. Ongoing reauthentication can be either intrusive by interrupting the user
and requiring a password or PIN to be entered, or nonintrusive in the case of biometrics where for example the
user’s identity is confirmed by their typing characteristics
[18],[19]. If correctly implemented, either will be an
improvement upon the current situation but it is important to
consider the most flexible and appropriate approach.
Section III discusses and then outlines a potential
framework that addresses these weaknesses and provides a
means by which mobile device security could be enhanced.
III.

ENHANCING SECURITY FOR MOBILE DEVICES

With individuals being likely to carry more than one
portable device and simultaneously interact with, or at least
be known to, other technology in their local vicinity at any
given time, possibilities exist to maximize this security
potential. For instance, in the morning on leaving the house a
worker might activate their business phone and Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA) whilst at the same time picking up
their car keys. By leveraging the relationship the user has
with these multiple devices and associating the identification
knowledge that each independently possesses, enhanced
assurance of the owner’s identity can be determined. At the
time of authentication, each device establishes a confidence
in the identity of the user, either true or false. Facilitating a
means of communicating the current security status between
the unique entities would allow them to bolster their own
confidence in the user’s identity.
Utilizing environmental awareness 2 and enabling the
devices to request and trade their current authentication
confidence, would provide a more flexible approach to
security administration. This self-governing method would
allow the party devices to adjust their own status through the
consideration of their peers and the surrounding
environment. The main drive is to achieve a position where a
newly activated piece of equipment would not require an
authentication process to be undertaken because the
surrounding near vicinity contains sufficient confidence in
the user’s identity, that it is considered unnecessary to do so.
Additionally, as the user relocates between areas of differing
threat (public spaces to a home or work environment), the

2

Devices such as mobile phones and laptop computers detect cellular and
wireless networks and other such information that provide a means to
recognize their current locale at any given time.

1

As opposed to devices such as laptop computers that generally rely on a
user name and associated password.
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devices could relay the situation to their counterparts
allowing each to react accordingly.
In order for such a system to operate, it is necessary to
first give some consideration to the underpinning
requirements:

to a local entity sufficiently powerful to complete the
operation. However, if no local device was available but
network or internet services were, the samples could
alternatively be passed to a remote authentication system
where the analysis could be executed and decision returned.

A. Biometrics
Using biometrics fits the requirements of a heightened
security methodology for mobile devices, on the basis that
they are characteristics that cannot be forgotten, divulged or
lost by their owner [20]. Further, biometrics divides into two
distinct tranches of study, physiological and behavioral [21].
The use of physiological biometrics is more often preferred
for identification purposes because of the greater degree of
uniqueness, experienced consistency and resilience to
external corruption [22]. However, it is best suited to pointof-entry scenarios where an individual would be happy or
certainly less discontent to tolerate the inconvenience
necessary to undergo the required process of identification.
For instance, having to place a hand upon a particular device,
or head at a specific angle, to enable the relevant scan to be
taken are both obtrusive procedures. Conversely, behavioral
biometrics lend themselves to authentication scenarios where
the identity of the individual is already established and
confirmation of a user's continuing presence is sought.
Behavioral traits can be detected unobtrusively enabling
validation to be carried out imperceptibly to the user [9],[14],
[18]. Capturing a voice sample during a mobile telephone
conversation would allow the device to compare extracted
voice patterns and nuances against a known and expected
reference vocal template. Executing such a process regularly
during use, facilitates a means by which the mobile device
could gain appropriate confidence in the user’s identity
during extended periods of otherwise unchecked access.
Although upon first consideration a single layer of
protection maybe deemed sufficient, [23] observed that
“Unimodal biometric systems have to contend with a variety
of problems such as noisy data, intra-class variations,
restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof
attacks, and unacceptable error rates”. With individual
biometrics failing to meet appropriate levels of acceptance,
attention has been turned to combining techniques in
multimodal authentication systems [14],[24]. There are a
plethora of circumstances where multimodal biometrics are
advantageous and would be the authentication method of
choice but not readily available because of technological
limitations.
By combining devices and available techniques it may be
possible to achieve the same objective without multi-layering
on any individual piece of equipment. Drawing together
authentication confidence from a number of disparate
devices would enable any one entity to make stronger and
more informed judgment calls. With the likelihood that
distinct devices will utilize different biometric techniques
with differing rigor and strength, combining the otherwise
unilateral decisions will further improve the ultimate
recognition process. An added advantage of this is that
captured identity samples could be communicated from
devices without the processing capability to analyze the data,

B. Security degradation
It can be argued that rather than remain static, the
authentication confidence should be eroded over time,
reducing service and application availability 3 [13]. Upon
reaching a significant point, re-authentication would be
necessary to re-determine the user’s credentials and once
more allocate appropriate confidence. Should this
undertaking be unsuccessful (as anticipated in the case of a
hijacking), service provision would degrade to such a degree
that the entity would be rendered un-usable; protecting the
information stored within and further misuse.
Some functions of mobile devices are more sensitive than
others and their illicit use could potentially incur greater cost
or harm. Rather than regarding every type of feature equally
it is sensible to enable a degree of flexibility in how each is
treated and protected with the introduction of confidence cutoffs. Operative tasks and applications could be allocated a
security tariff allowing some functions to be carried out with
a low confidence whilst at an equal level others would be
blocked entirely. For instance with low confidence it would
be acceptable to operate a calculator application but the
ability to instigate a telephone call would be barred.
Additionally, the calculator application would not only
function at a lower tariff but it could be allowed a slower rate
of degradation implying that it would take longer for it to
reach the cutoff point of inoperability [20].
Dynamically adjusting the rate of decay to reflect the
environment in which a device is being used will enable the
model to adapt. In public, high-risk areas, a steeper rate of
erosion could be utilized, whilst in a familiar and perceived
low risk environment a flatter more sedate timescale
employed. Indeed the decay space becomes a complex ndimensional curve with degrees of freedom including
application sensitivity, time, location, method of
authentication and user behavior. Consideration of these
factors and more will dictate at what percentage point
confidence will be at any given moment in time.
Section III(C) builds on this approach and further
explores how it could be used to improve security.
C. Device interaction
As proposed in section III(A) enabling disparate devices
owned by the user to communicate will bring advantages in
achieving strong methods of authentication. Additional
identity confidence could also be obtained by gathering the
authentication status of nearby devices. Distinct devices are
likely to utilize different methods of authentication and using
this array of approaches arguably establishes a more robust
security profile. By enabling entities to recognize each other
3

For instance, within the first few minutes following device activation the
likelihood that the owner has been replaced by an impostor is much less
than it would be after an hour.
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and communicate their current state of user identity
confidence, the degradation process could be slowed or even
reversed.
Fig. 1 below shows a conceptual diagram of the
relationship paths that might be established by a user’s set of
personal devices 4 and the variety of authentication
techniques that might be employed.
Information sharing would be carried out between trusted
pairs via a near field communication (NFC) channel such as
Bluetooth. Utilizing NFC will ensure the security envelope is
restricted to the local vicinity and acquired confidence is
confined to entities within the physical proximity of the
requesting device. Additionally, ensuring the intra device
trust would effectively eliminate responses from unknown
third party entities. Without doing this, a degrading device
might poll the surrounding near vicinity for listening pieces
of equipment and one owned by a different user might
respond with an assurance of confidence which although
true, would not be in the same user’s identity. If accepted
and permitted to proceed, the alien device would falsely
bolster the observed identity confidence.
Furthermore, associating a weighting tariff to the method
of authentication would allow equipment to utilize robust
techniques that they would otherwise not have the ability to
use [13]. The tariff system could then be extended to either
slow or accelerate the rate of confidence decay (see section
III(B)). For instance, a laptop computer might have an inbuilt
fingerprint scanner with a high tariff of robustness. The same

person’s mobile telephone might only authenticate via a PIN
number; a far less rigorous form of authentication. Thus by
drawing upon the laptop’s high tariff confidence, the mobile
phone could gain an enhanced state of assurance and thereby
extend a slower degradation than would otherwise have been
appropriate. Introducing additional items and allowing every
device to trade and negotiate confidence with every other
will synthesize a flexible and self maintaining security
environment.
This region of localized security can also be augmented
by constructing the system in such a way that it can be
introduced and subsequently recognize the local
environment. This could be achieved by sensing available
wireless networks and associating them with locations,
allowing degradation tariffs to be correspondingly allocated
within an administration function. The tariffs or weightings
associated with public spaces can be utilized to degrade
confidence more rapidly than those linked with more private
arenas. By integrating the ability to detect and consequently
recognize known locales, the model will react and adapt
independently of human intervention. Hence, as the user
crosses environment boundaries security and awareness can
be immediately heightened or relaxed respectively increasing
or reducing the frequency that re-authentication is requested.
It may even be possible to associate the user’s behavior and
device interaction with locations or at least perceived
security threats. That is, through use and experience each
device might be able to recognize that the user only activates
certain applications when at home or in equally low threat
surroundings. Vice versa particular services or operations
might be utilized in public areas or correspondingly high risk
locations, allowing immediate yet discrete security
adjustments to be made. This is achievable via the adaptation
of behavior based identification techniques [25].
IV.

SYSTEM ANATOMY

Having explored the core features and requirements of
the proposed approach to mobile device security it is now
possible to examine and discuss in greater detail how such a
framework could be implemented. This section addresses the
core elements, the role each plays and how they might be
united to achieve a robust and adaptive security system.
The suggested system would consist of a core control
engine with the ability to hook into and utilize five peripheral
elements; the local environment, database storage, device
operating system, one or more authentication mechanisms
and the other member devices. Fig. 2 outlines how the
elements would combine and the direction of information
flow between the disparate parts of the anatomy. It also
illustrates the elements that are located within the physical
body of the device and those that lie beyond.
Centric to each device is envisaged to be the Adaptive
Security Control Engine (ASCE), which will manage and
direct the internal security. It will be required to hook into
the device operating system in order to influence and apply
relevant security policies based upon the action and
authentication success of the user. Post-initial authentication
and the establishment of an identity confidence the ASCE

Figure 1. The potential intra-device relationship and authentication
techniques for a given user

4

The mobile telephone is shown as centric to the scheme because of the
likelihood that it is the one device that is ever present upon the legitimate
user’s person.

307

objectives of the BioAPI Consortium [26] which has
specified an international standard for interfacing to
biometric systems. Utilizing this framework and extending it
to both biometric and non-biometric methodologies would
enable a single engine to accept and function with a number
of identity confirming processes. That is, a mobile phone
should be typically capable of utilizing authentication via
PIN, voice recognition, facial recognition or even keystroke
analysis. One or more of these could be plugged into the
engine facilitating the necessary provision of identity
recognition.
Some devices will operate a two-way interaction with
their surrounding security counterparts; for instance a laptop
computer will both request and provide security details.
However, it may be possible to utilize some entities that only
contribute by their presence, providing a form of token-based
security. Car keys are an example of such an item;
incorporating these so that their mere presence, indicated by
replying to a polled request, can be used to bolster security
confidence in the user’s identity (i.e. because the holder can
show themselves to be in possession of a larger set of
physical artifacts associated with the legitimate user).
Fig. 3 above shows a succinct representation of the
relative sophistication of devices that might be used by the
ASCE. It can be argued that any device that can be placed on
the scale from “Full two-way” to “Passive presence only”
can in some way contribute to the security envelope. Thus
this approach is ultimately flexible and scalable to a huge
variety of devices with or without built in processing
intelligence.
Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the ASCE will use a data
repository to store relevant information, parameters and
details, of its own status and other devices in the security
partnership. The repository is made up of a number of data
tables that would store both persistent reference information
and working details updated in real-time.

Figure 2. Adaptive security environment

will administer the degradation of confidence using the
methodology (or similar to) outlined in subsection III(B).
This concept of degradation will potentially be further
influenced by the environment in which the device is being
operated. To achieve this, ASCE will need to utilize an
environment-sensing module that will learn to recognize
localities and their associated threat, and use this to affect the
rate at which the confidence in the user's identity is being
eroded. As discussed earlier in this document, operating a
laptop at home is expected to be less of a threat than using
one whilst waiting in a public space; by adjusting the rate of
decay accordingly, these expectations can be incorporated
into the framework.
Authentication, although controlled and requested by the
ASCE, will be carried out by authentication mechanisms that
communicate via a generic interface. This will allow the
ASCE to be a portable concept that can be applied to many
different types of device, making it independent of a specific
set of hardware. The generic approach aligns itself with the

Laptop, smart
phone, PDA, PC

V.

In addition to the base technological concepts there are
other matters that will require careful consideration prior to
implementation of the framework. Privacy and the associated
risk of transmitting biometric template information between
devices when one is incapable of unilaterally processing a
sample, is such an example. Appropriate encryption and
communication channel security will have to be employed to
protect against eavesdropping and remove the potential for
man-in-the-middle attacks. Introducing such protection will
incur additional processing overheads that will impact upon
the operational performance of the framework.
Indeed, computational, memory, battery and network
performance issues also demand investigation to ensure that
the framework can be adapted to function on as many
categories and types of device as possible. Ultimately it is
desirable to employ the smallest footprint possible, so it is
inevitable that there will be some element of compromise to
avoid precluding potential technology.
Although this paper has proposed biometrics as a suitable
authentication candidate, it is important to note that with

Full two-way
interaction

Mobile phone
MP3 player

Car keys
Contactless credit
card

DISCUSSION

Passive presence
only
contribution

Figure 3. Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent
contribution to the authentication process.
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distinct methods greatly differing levels of performance can
be experienced. This is amplified by the need to adapt some
biometric techniques so they can be employed in a nonintrusive manner [9]. Designing the framework to operate
with a plug-and-play capability will lessen some of these
demands and enable alternatives to be used but will
concurrently increase the complexity of the necessary
interface.
Trust is another major area of focus. Trust between
devices will need to be established and at times revoked. It is
imperative that this process correctly addresses usability and
is implemented in a way that is logical, secure, yet easy to
use. Aside from aesthetics, devices will also need the ability
to receive and utilize un-trusted environmental information.
Parsing this information correctly will enable devices to
draw appropriate detail whist remaining secure and removed
from threat.
Operational thresholds for applications and device
services are one final area that requires further investigation.
As yet it is unclear how best to invoke them; a simple
ranking and user selected scale may be suitable for some
applications but for others a more complex approach
dependent upon a number of variables might be more fitting.
As the design of the framework evolves it is hoped that these
factors will clarify and allow appropriate decisions to be
taken.
VI.
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